Using Formal Verification to Evaluate Single Event Upsets in a RISC-V Core
PaperFirst seen 7/10/2026
Last seen 7/10/2026
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31 connectionsThe paper compares its backward tracing formal method with simulation-based forward tracing.
The paper uses model checking as its formal verification approach.
The paper proposes backward tracing to identify and categorize faults by their effects.
The paper evaluates the SEU reliability of the RISC-V Ibex Core.
Strobe properties are developed to identify SEUs causing SDCs by comparing golden and faulty cores.
Architectural properties specify RISC-V core behavior to identify SEUs.
Crash properties are developed to find SEUs that cause crashes.
Hang properties are developed to identify SEUs causing system hangs.
Properties are written as SystemVerilog Assertions for model checking.
Cadence JasperGold FPV is used to perform model checking at the RTL level.
JasperGold Superlint App is used to automatically generate Dead State and Live State properties.
AUX code in SystemVerilog is developed to abstract memories.
Triple Modular Redundancy is suggested as a protection technique for vulnerable bits such as the program counter.
COI analysis is used in model checking to filter irrelevant signals and speed up verification.
Memory abstraction is used to reduce state space by black-boxing IMEM and DMEM.
Double Event Upsets are mentioned as future work to expand the method.
Fault Tree Analysis is mentioned in the related work as a system reliability evaluation method.
Runtime verification is mentioned as a type of formal verification technique used in related work.
The paper is authored by Bing Xue.
Faults are injected using XOR gates added to the design.
A fault controller module outputs mask signals to control the XOR gates for fault injection.
Auxiliary SystemVerilog code is developed to abstract memories and handle communication signals.
Simulation-based fault injection is mentioned as the widely used alternative to formal verification.
Random fault injection is mentioned as a compromise that reduces accuracy and fault coverage.
The paper is authored by Mark Zwolinski.
The authors are affiliated with the University of Southampton.
The paper uses formal verification to evaluate hardware reliability.
Fault coverage is mentioned as a metric reduced by random fault injection.
Bounded Model Checking is used as an alternative to full model checking to handle state explosion.
ISO 26262 mandates simulation-based fault injection for automotive safety applications.
Fault injection is implemented as part of the SEU identification method.